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**Conflict-sensitive approaches  
to development practice**

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## List of Abbreviations

CIA	Conflict Impact Assessment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
NCCK	National Council of Churches for Kenya
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD-Development Assistance Committee
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
RTC	Responding to Conflict
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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## Abstract

*This report, originally commissioned as a background paper by IDRC for a consultative meeting addressing conflict prevention and development practice, aims to provide a critical overview of the approaches to development being defined by donors, academic institutions, as well as NGOs and agencies charged with the delivery of effective aid and development programmes in conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas. Governmental and non-governmental actors alike increasingly recognise the need for conflict-sensitive approaches to development and humanitarian assistance and are consequently attempting to develop the theoretical underpinnings as well as the structural prerequisites for integrating conflict-sensitive perspectives into development assistance. The paper seeks to highlight the range of different approaches and to identify both their strengths and limitations. It concludes by proposing some of the important policy issues which need to be addressed if conflict-sensitive development approaches are to have broader relevance and impact.*

## Introduction

The growing understanding in recent years of the links between conflict, peace and external assistance has sharpened the focus on the role which development co-operation can play in both ameliorating and exacerbating the root causes of violent conflict. The new awareness has highlighted the need to explore how development co-operation and other forms of external assistance can contribute to conflict prevention. Thus, both at the policy planning and institutional levels, a number of western donors, NGOs and academic institutions have begun to incorporate conflict prevention objectives into their assistance programmes. A number of processes have been undertaken, including development of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) tools, establishment of early warning units, setting up of post-conflict reconstruction programmes and development of conflict prevention networks, to name but a few.

Despite the increased attention to policy formulation and the multifarious efforts to mainstream peace building and conflict prevention through establishment of institutional structures and development of conflict assessment frameworks, donors are still some way from developing effective and coherent approaches to conflict prevention. This paper attempts to look at some of the issues which are shaping donor policy, examines some of the PCIA tools that have been developed and looks at issues which will need to be addressed if conflict-sensitive development is to be mainstreamed.

The first section of the report provides a background to the impetus behind the development of conflict prevention and peace building policies among donors and NGOs. Section two outlines the rationale for development of PCIA tools and related methodologies and provides a comparative survey of bilateral and multilateral agency frameworks. Section three provides an analysis of PCIA methodologies and frameworks which reflects the experience of a sample of development and humanitarian agencies and NGOs. The final section of the report draws conclusions and makes recommendations for the future development and support of conflict-sensitive development practices and related approaches to conflict mitigation and peace-building. The final section also clarifies some of the important policy issues which need to be addressed if PCIA is to have broader relevance and impact.

# Section 1

## The development of conflict-sensitive approaches to development and humanitarian assistance

There has been a growing understanding in recent years of the links between conflict, peace and development and increased focus on the role which official development co-operation can play in both ameliorating and exacerbating the root causes of violent conflict. The development of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines in 1997 signalled a sea-change in the thinking of donors with respect to conflict prevention.<sup>1</sup> Central to the OECD-DAC rationale was the need to explore how development co-operation could “contribute proactively to conflict prevention and post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.” Thus, improving efficiency, effectiveness and coherence, and developing practical policy guidance for planning and implementing programmes in complex political environments, were promoted as critical elements for development assistance.

For humanitarian and development agencies, as well as NGOs, the focus on conflict-sensitive approaches to intervention has arisen in response to the need for more effective programmes with demonstrable positive impact as well as to the pressure to establish programmes which minimise the negative consequences of aid assistance. Emergency aid and development projects, it is accepted, can contribute to the exacerbation of conflict and inequality. The Great Lakes, Liberia and Kosovo conflicts all provided valuable lessons for humanitarian actors, but also led to increased scrutiny of the role of NGOs and agencies in complex emergencies.<sup>2</sup>

It is now widely agreed that only co-ordinated and coherent responses, which explicitly address root causes of conflict and take account of the dynamics of accelerating and triggering factors, have the potential to make a long-term positive impact on violent conflict.

The new support among policy makers for peace-building and conflict prevention is underpinned by the recognition of a range of important considerations, including that:

**Humanitarian assistance can exacerbate conflict:** The rethinking of donor and NGO policies has been informed by a deeper analysis of the links between aid and conflict, especially as regards the unexpected negative consequences of relief assistance. This reassessment is partly led by increased awareness that relief assistance can cement divisions between conflicting groups and may contribute to entrenchment of war economies and ultimately to the prolonging of war. Relief assistance, it is acknowledged, frequently distorts social relations, entrenches inequalities and can allow elite and/or armed groups to benefit disproportionately from unrest. This was starkly observed in Liberia during its civil war, and in Somalia where aid initially succoured warring factions before new policy frameworks were introduced which linked assistance to the achievement of stability.

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<sup>1</sup> OECD-DAC, *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Critics such as Alex de Waal and Mark Duffield have questioned the impact and accountability of NGOs in complex emergencies.

### **Somalia 1993: aid and the humanitarian response**

Foreign aid to Somalia averaged \$459m between 1984 and 1989. "For Somalis, ideas of international aid were shaped by the experience of the 1980s when aid poured unabated into Somalia, right into the pockets of government officials." (Smith 1996). The extremely visible, high-tech resources which accompanied the large-scale humanitarian intervention of 1992-93 merely exacerbated the misrepresentation of aid; this being most clearly manifested in the diversion and appropriation of aid by warring parties. The events of 1993 in Somalia led to open questioning of the international response, in particular the role of the UN whose efforts were undermined by the "lack of clear political objectives to be pursued and the lack of coherence of the means used".

#### **(European Parliament 1992)**

The Addis Ababa Declaration of 1993 identified conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation aid to Somalia and called for strengthened co-ordination. The Declaration "emphasised that although essential emergency assistance would remain unconditional, peace and stability as well as adequate Somali participation would be prerequisites for reconstruction and rehabilitation." Through its Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance and the 1997 Strategy on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia, the conditions of the Addis Ababa Declaration were refined to develop the "peace dividend approach". This aimed to ensure that international assistance was not only relevant to local efforts for reconstruction but also to peace building.

**(Adapted from E Visman: Saferworld report, 1998)**

**Development processes can exacerbate conflict:** Development assistance programmes also have the potential to increase tensions and exacerbate conflict, even in relatively stable environments. A Saferworld study on the impact of EU engagement in Ethiopia found that EU-supported large-scale commercial farming enterprises deepened inequality, restricted access to vital resources and increased tensions between competing pastoralist groups and between pastoralists and the state. The tensions ultimately led to open conflict which has yet to be fully resolved.<sup>3</sup> The failure of development to adequately prioritise conflict prevention has meant that potentially beneficial programmes have created mistrust and disharmony and ultimately undermined the successful achievement of project objectives. Inadequately planned or inappropriate targeted programmes can marginalise vulnerable groups, overlook underlying root causes of poverty and contribute to the risks of violent conflict. Consequently, many donors are attempting to revise their approach in favour of policy frameworks that emphasise structural stability, under which support for good governance, human rights and representative civil society is enhanced.<sup>4</sup> The debate around the impact of development assistance and conflict has also led to a fundamental questioning of aid systems and the impact of global economic processes. Development has largely failed to reduce inequality or to deliver broad-based growth and this is leading to further consideration of the links between aid systems and conflict.

### **The Mahaweli Programme in Sri Lanka**

The World Bank-supported Mahaweli programme aimed to alleviate land shortages in the south-west of Sri Lanka, an area mainly populated by Sinhalese. The project consisted of subsidiary energy generation, coupled with resettlement of Sinhalese to parts of the country mainly populated by Tamils and Muslims. The support to Sinhalese groups at the expense of other groups became a decisive motivating factor for Tamil resistance, the settlement policy is regarded as a element in escalating Sri Lanka's civil war.

**(S Klingebiel, *The OECD, World Bank & IMF*, 2000)**

<sup>3</sup> Saferworld report: *EU policies and the risk of violent conflict in Ethiopia's Awash Valley*, August 2000.

<sup>4</sup> Structural stability is a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict; *Communication from the Commission to the Council on the EU and the issue of conflicts in Africa: peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond*, 1996.

**A secure environment is a prerequisite for poverty eradication:** International organisations, governments, donors, academics, development and humanitarian agencies now all explicitly acknowledge this, and that war and violence, if left unchecked, can undermine the benefits of development. The Secretary General of the UN has stated that the consequences of conflict seriously undermine efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace and has called for action to tackle the causes of conflict and promote durable peace and sustainable development.

#### **Security Sector Reform**

Poverty-reducing, environmentally sustainable development is most likely to occur when political systems facilitate a reasonably equitable distribution of economic and political power and a reasonably equitable division of the fruits of development. In other words, poverty reducing environmentally sustainable development requires due attention to political and economic governance. In many parts of the world, the security sector has a direct and negative impact on development precisely because political and economic governance is inadequate. While weak governance reduces the ability of the security forces to perform their assigned tasks, it is also often one of the primary outcomes of political involvement on the part of the security forces.

**Nicole Ball, Towards a Conceptual Framework for Security Sector Reform. 2000**

Some donor governments have taken tentative steps towards developing and implementing comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) policies and programmes which are underpinned by democratic principles and good governance. However, most multilateral and bilateral donors are still some way from engaging in development of such proposals. Some donors have faced political constraints which have prevented the introduction of SSR as part of external engagement and this has had implications for the coherence of approaches among donors and across instruments. Having said that, the conceptual framework developed by the DAC Task Force is a significant step toward the clarification of objectives.

**The costs of conflict cannot be sustained:** There is general consensus on this. Armed conflicts take place in some of the poorest countries in the world, affecting the psychological, social and material conditions of individuals and societies. Industries are destroyed, social services are abandoned, agricultural areas are laid waste and already poor populations face the threat of famine. Conflict-related migration increases vulnerability of war-affected populations, particularly children and women. In addition, military expenditure diverts spending from social services, and protracted conflicts deter foreign investment. Furthermore, the costs of rebuilding war-torn societies are high for national governments, civil society and international donors. The wars in Kosovo, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and the Balkans, to name some more recent situations, have impaired development, stifled economic growth and prevented the maturation of political institutions.

#### **The costs of conflict**

In Rwanda alone, an estimated 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 genocide, 1.5 million people were internally displaced and a further 800,000 made refugees. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has estimated that the costs to the international community of the seven major wars in the 1990s (excluding Kosovo and calculated before the close of the decade) had been \$199 billion. This is in addition to the costs to the countries actually at war. Conflict-related humanitarian emergencies shift funds from long-term development assistance into relief and this is increasingly of concern to international donors and humanitarian agencies. The proportion of emergency relief rose to 10% of the total development co-operation budget of OECD member states, in the 1990s. Over the same period the total amount of international assistance fell sharply.



**War economies have to be tackled:** There is growing awareness of the need to confront the forces benefiting from war. The appropriation of national and private assets, often through looting, and the illicit trade of high value commodities (diamonds, hardwoods, etc) often provide warring parties with opportunities to profit from chaos and disorder. The illicit arms and diamond trades are now thought to be critical factors in prolonging and deepening conflicts and in internationalising conflict. The trade in precious commodities feeds directly into the acquisition of weapons which can further escalate conflict and embroil neighbouring states in violence and illicit activities. Indeed, the wealth to be made from commodities such as diamonds influences both the strategies adopted by warring parties and the proliferation of parties to conflict. The seminal study conducted by Global Witness, examining the links between the diamond trade and war in Angola, suggests that UNITA<sup>5</sup> shifted its bases from the south of the country to the north and central regions in order to control the diamond fields and thus become self-financing. UNITA's new financial independence has allowed "the conflict in Angola to reach levels of destruction far in excess of that during the Cold War."<sup>6</sup> Recent research also suggests that conflicts can "mutate into wars where immediate agendas assume an increasingly important role which can in turn prolong civil wars. These economic agendas can create widespread destitution which itself may feed into economically motivated violence."<sup>7</sup> The growing awareness of the complex interplay between "greed and grievance" is beginning to inform donor and NGO policies, albeit gradually.

**Traditional foreign policy instruments have limited effectiveness:** Also informing the policy debate is the recognition that traditional foreign policy tools are insufficient for conflict prevention and crisis management and that a range of enhanced instruments and mechanisms have to be developed which will place conflict prevention objectives at the centre of engagement.

Policy errors too have had a negative impact on conflict, the conferring of diplomatic recognition on Croatia without guaranteeing security being one such instance.<sup>8</sup> Thus it is accepted that traditional diplomatic, political and military instruments need to be improved and expanded in order to enhance conflict prevention policies.

**Growing pressure to demonstrate effectiveness and accountability:** The proliferation of peace-building projects has coincided with increased pressure on development co-operation to demonstrate impact. For example, the range of new peace-building projects funded under the Canadian Peace-building Initiative Fund since 1997 face the double challenge of demonstrating that they have peace-building impact in the field while meeting established criteria for accountability and effectiveness. Other donors and implementing agencies are also grappling with the need to develop indicators that can demonstrate that development assistance can have a positive impact on peace. Most evaluations to date are very cautious in this regard and stress the limited impact of aid in general. A few positive, albeit modest examples of positive impact are described below.

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<sup>5</sup> National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

<sup>6</sup> Mark Duffied in *Greedy and Grievance*, International Peace Academy, 2000

<sup>7</sup> M Berdal and D Malone, *Greedy and Grievance*, International Peace Academy, 2000

<sup>8</sup> M Lund, *Creeping Institutionalisation of the Culture of Prevention?* background paper, report from the Krusenberg Seminar, SIDA, June 2000.

### **Examples of rehabilitation and development activities with a focus on conflict prevention**

**Rapid change/refugees:** In Malawi, communities that hosted a large number of refugees from Mozambique were provided with improved public services (health centres, schools, water points). These measures benefited both the local population and the refugees and so alleviated the stress put on the locals by the large numbers of refugees. This helped to ease the relations between both groups.

**(APT Consult 1998)**

**Pluralism and participation:** In Mozambique, donors played a major role in keeping the elections on schedule and supporting the transformation of RENAMO from a rebel military movement into a political party.

**(Suhrke et al. 1997)**

**Disarmament:** In Mozambique, a programme has been established to collect and destroy arms in exchange for tools and other items for income-generation activities. This is supported by public peace education and training for volunteers, thus strengthening local capacities

**(Suhrke et al 1997)<sup>9</sup>**

In short, the conflict prevention and peace building focus of donors, agencies and NGOs has sharpened over the last five years, shaped by the need to address the root cause of conflict, to ensure a secure environment for development, to minimise the costs of conflict and to guarantee that development co-operation progresses toward implementation of conflict prevention objectives and instruments in a coherent and co-ordinated manner. In contrast to the observable spread of conflict prevention principles, it is still difficult however, to obtain credible information about development projects which have successfully integrated the new approaches.

## **Institutional and policy changes in support of conflict-sensitive approaches to development**

Donor governments, multilateral institutions and NGOs have embarked on initiatives to integrate conflict prevention into the range of development assistance instruments. The initiatives have resulted in both institutional changes and development of new policy and planning instruments.

A number of countries have established departments or bodies specifically charged with conflict prevention. Table 1 provides an overview of the institutional changes made by a range of donors over the last five years. Even though progress has been made in taking forward donor policies in support of conflict prevention, through the establishment of new institutions and departments, there is concern over inconsistencies and incoherence within some donor governments. The Netherlands for example, while seeking to increase the attention it gives to democracy and human rights issues through the setting up of new structures, has simultaneously adopted a restrictive selection process for partner countries. This is of concern as some "at risk" countries, including Kenya, are excluded from priority development co-operation. However, it does need to be acknowledged that the Netherlands government is making considerable progress in adopting conflict-sensitive approaches to development in policy planning.

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<sup>9</sup> Based upon: M Leonhardt, *Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries*, A Saferworld and International Alert Publication, January 2000.

Questions have also arisen over the effectiveness of “housing” conflict prevention in departments which may be isolated from more mainstream political decision-making processes. Without the implementation of coherent policies across government departments, involving the full range of aid, trade, diplomacy and defence instruments, the effectiveness of institutions will remain limited. The German and UK governments among others have recognised the necessity of ensuring that relevant ministries participate in policy development and implementation. The UK Government, for example, has taken formative steps in applying “joined-up” government strategies to foreign engagement. An interdepartmental UK government mission to Nigeria in 2000 was an initial attempt to define a cross-governmental foreign agenda.

Sweden is attempting to promote a culture of prevention and to strengthen international institutional frameworks in support of preventive instruments. To this end the Swedes are supporting democratisation (electoral processes, judicial reform, human rights ombudsmen) as part of attempts to integrate conflict prevention dimensions into development co-operation. Sweden is also seeking to enhance the EU’s capacity for conflict prevention through its presidency of the EU in the first half of 2001 and to strengthen the UN’s conflict prevention capacity.<sup>10</sup>

Some bilateral donors have yet to respond to the challenge to incorporate conflict prevention within foreign affairs structures or to formulate conflict-sensitive policies. Neither Italy nor France, for example, has instituted conflict prevention policies or structures within development (although Italy does have a conflict prevention desk in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs); their limited institutional capacity may prevent them from establishing bodies in the near future. Indeed, Italy has responded to its institutional problems of administering aid by channelling funds into co-financing arrangements with multilateral donors. There is a danger that when donor governments shift development resources to multilaterals they may also devolve important policy influence. This can have important implications for conflict prevention and coherence.

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<sup>10</sup> Sweden aims to set up a group of friends of the Secretary General, promote the establishment of a permanent fact-finding mechanisms and contribute to the UN conflict prevention fund.

**Table 1: Institutional structures and commitments to conflict prevention and peace building by some relevant donors<sup>11</sup>**

Donor	Unit/Departments responsible for conflict prevention and peace building	Conflict prevention and peace building objectives/activities
<b>Belgium</b>	Administration for Development Co-operation: Peace and Conflict Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Development of PCIA tools</li> <li>➤ Post conflict fund</li> <li>➤ work on light weapons and arms trade</li> </ul>
<b>Canada</b>	<p>The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)</p> <p>Department of Foreign Affairs: Peace Building and Human Security Division</p>	<p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Peace building unit: conflict prevention, conflict resolution, reconciliation, dialogue promotion</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <p>Conflict prevention, peace work, democracy promotion, policy development and programme implementation</p>
<b>Denmark</b>	Peace and Stability Fund within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Prevent the destruction of development co-operation inputs</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Building local conflict management capacities</li> <li>➤ Addressing the structural causes of conflict</li> </ul>
<b>European Commission</b>	<p>Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit</p> <p>DG Development</p> <p>DG RELEX</p> <p>ECHO</p>	<p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Humanitarian aid and rescue services, mine clearance, disarmament, supply of police personnel, support for democratisation, monitoring elections &amp; human rights, conflict mediation</li> <li>➤ Improving the EU's early warning capacity</li> <li>➤ Improving the EU's rapid response capacity</li> </ul> <p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Improving country analysis, assessing the impacts of EU policies</li> <li>➤ Integrating conflict-sensitive approaches to development</li> <li>➤ Support to democratisation and human rights</li> <li>➤ Practical guide to peace building and conflict prevention.</li> <li>➤ Implementation of Cotonou Agreement (esp. Article 11)</li> </ul> <p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Enhancing EU capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building: political analysis, country and region policy frameworks, institutional framework for co-ordination of policy instruments</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Regional aid policy frameworks for promoting peace through development co-operation</li> <li>➤ Funding mechanisms to address violent conflict</li> <li>➤ Targeted rehabilitation support</li> </ul> <p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ To adopt neutral approach to aid but do prevention peace-building at planning level</li> <li>➤ Development of disaster early-warning indicators</li> </ul>
<b>Germany</b>	German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ)	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Eradicating the structural causes of violence</li> <li>➤ Encouraging non-violent conflict management mechanisms</li> <li>➤ Mainstreaming crisis prevention</li> <li>➤ Selecting key countries for development co-operation linked to crisis prevention</li> </ul>

<sup>11</sup> Adapted from M Leonhardt, *CIA of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries*, International Alert & Safer world, 2000.

Donor	Unit/Departments responsible for Conflict prevention and peace building	Conflict prevention and peace-building objectives/activities
IMF	IMF	<p><b>Objective:</b> Temporary support to balance of payments problems</p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Resources are being made available for emergency assistance for post-conflict countries under new financing instrument introduced in 1995. 7 countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tadjikistan and Guinea-Bissau) have received Assistance under this scheme.</li> </ul>
Japan	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)—Planning and Evaluation Department—Global Issues Division	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Emergency relief during and right after conflicts</li> <li>➤ Post-conflict reconstruction</li> <li>➤ Conflict prevention</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Support for refugees; emergency relief to neighbouring countries directly/indirectly affected by refugees</li> <li>➤ Rehabilitation of basic infrastructures; Land mine removal and mine victim support; Promotion of repatriation; Vocational training</li> <li>➤ Rehabilitation of economic infrastructures; Human resources development; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration(DDR); Election monitoring; Security sector reform</li> <li>➤ Democratisation; Governance; Human rights; Poverty alleviation; Peace education; Small arms control; Support to free media</li> </ul>
The Netherlands	Conflict Management and Humanitarian Aid Department (DCH) set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Integrated strategy that incorporates development co-operation, political mediation, emergency aid, economic sanctions and military operations</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Demobilisation</li> <li>➤ Support for a multi-ethnic police force</li> </ul>
Norway	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Comprehensive, integrated approach embracing humanitarian assistance, peace and reconciliation and development</li> <li>➤ Conflict prevention and consolidation of peace processes</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <p>Peace-building measures in 22 countries</p>
OECD/DAC	Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <p>Co-ordinating activities of bilateral donors with aim of improving effectiveness of development co-operation and crisis prevention and management</p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Development of “orientations of participatory development and good governance”</li> <li>➤ Development of guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation</li> <li>➤ Work programme with three objectives: draw conclusions from experience on the connection between conflict peace and development; improve effectiveness and coherence of DAC members; policy guidelines for formulation and implementation of programmes in conflict prevention</li> <li>➤ Task force launched “...scope for use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict”</li> <li>➤ Theoretical and conceptual framework for conflict development</li> </ul>

Donor	Unit/Departments responsible for Conflict prevention and peace building	Conflict prevention and peace-building objectives/Activities
<b>OSCE</b>	<p>High Commissioner for National Minorities</p> <p>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</p> <p>Forum for Security Co-operation</p>	<p><b>Objective:</b> Early identification of ethnic tensions and early resolution</p> <p><b>Activities:</b> Preventative diplomacy, promotion of dialogue, on-site missions</p> <p><b>Objective:</b> Promotion of democratic elections</p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Practical support in consolidating democratic institutions, respect for human rights, strengthening civil society</li> <li>➤ Monitoring implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments</li> </ul> <p><b>Objective:</b> Developing and implementing stabilising measures for localised crisis situations</p>
<b>Sweden</b>	<p>Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA)</p>	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Promote a culture of prevention</li> <li>➤ Develop an international system of norms and strength implementation</li> <li>➤ Strengthen the international institutional framework and preventive instruments</li> <li>➤ Strengthen Sweden's capacity for international conflict-prevention activities in various policy areas</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Identify structural risk factors</li> <li>➤ Review of development co-operation</li> <li>➤ Promotion of children's rights in armed conflict</li> <li>➤ Small arms, support to data base (SIPRI)</li> <li>➤ Support for democratisation (electoral processes, judicial reform, human rights ombudsmen)</li> <li>➤ Strengthen EU capacity for conflict prevention</li> <li>➤ Secondment of staff to OSCE field missions</li> <li>➤ Secondment of police officers to UN and OSCE</li> <li>➤ Support to IGAD peace processes for Somalia and Sudan</li> <li>➤ Establish network for conflict management</li> </ul>
<b>Switzerland</b>	<p>Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation</p> <p>Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs</p>	<p><b>Objective:</b> To promote Conflict-sensitive development</p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Small scale projects linked to clear analysis Objectives</li> <li>➤ Early Warning</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Support for the FAST early warning project of the Swiss Peace Foundation</li> </ul>

Donor	Unit /Departments responsible for Conflict prevention and peace building	Conflict prevention and peace-building objectives/ Activities
United Kingdom	<p>Department for International Development (DFID)</p> <p>Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Department</p> <p>Ministerial Group on Conflict Prevention (Ministers from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO], the Treasury, DFID, Ministry of Defence [MOD])</p>	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Promotion of social cohesiveness and inclusion</li> <li>➤ Improvement of the international mechanisms for settling disputes and preventing conflicts</li> <li>➤ Assistance in the limitation of means of waging war</li> <li>➤ Integrated approach between FCO, the MoD, and the private sector to bring about security sector reform in the partner government</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Improving conflict analysis capacity in country assistance programmes.</li> <li>➤ Researching conflict impact assessment</li> <li>➤ Arms control support</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Support of security sector reforms</li> <li>➤ Complementing conflict prevention and peace-building efforts by DFID</li> <li>➤ Closer inter-departmental work on conflict prevention and resolution</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities: (in the foreseeable future)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Peace-building, peace-keeping, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ul>
United Nations	<p>United Nations Development Programme</p>	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Work towards structural stability with support directed at political institutions and practices that enable society to manage change without allowing disputes to escalate into violence</li> <li>➤ Protect development gains so as to prevent reversals</li> <li>➤ Adopt a strategic approach by conducting analysis of root causes of conflict taking into account the national and regional context, and defining the nature and scope of international action</li> <li>➤ Reinforce in-country coordination to ensure that staff capacities both in the government and resident coordinators' offices are appropriately strengthened and given adequate technical support</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Information, policy and advocacy</li> <li>➤ Area development and action at the community level</li> <li>➤ Resettlement and reintegration of uprooted populations</li> <li>➤ Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants</li> <li>➤ Mine action</li> <li>➤ Good governance, judicial systems, electoral assistance and observance of human rights</li> <li>➤ Strengthening the macro-economic environment</li> <li>➤ Rebuilding physical infrastructure</li> <li>➤ Protection of the environment and natural disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness</li> </ul>

<p><b>United States</b></p>	<p>➤ USAID</p>	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Construct short-term, targeted , operational prevention and long-term, capacity building, structural prevention</li> <li>➤ Create capable states, in which development aid constructively works to strengthen emerging nations and in the process helps to create markets, reduce threats, promote self reliance, adhere to rule-based regimes, and prevent the emergence of mass violence</li> <li>➤ Construct capable states, characterised by representative governance based on rule of law, market economic activity, thriving civil society, security, well-being and justice available to all citizens, and the ability to manage internal and external affairs peacefully</li> <li>➤ Build local capacity: 'upstream' implementation by local actors, through which citizens can learn self-governance</li> <li>➤ Engage multiple actors from the U.S. government and private sector so as to incorporate their skills and expertise in the design and implementation of the foreign assistance vision</li> <li>➤ Develop better mechanisms for inter-agency collaboration to encourage greater information sharing, increased co-ordination, and more efficient allocation of tasks to avoid duplication and conserve precious foreign aid resources</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Fund objective analysis of inequity grievances, to show where they could lead to violence and how to redress them</li> <li>➤ Develop good-governance centers in and out of government</li> <li>➤ Develop the multitude of civil society bodies needed for free and democratic representative government</li> <li>➤ Strengthen independent judiciary and legislative bodies</li> <li>➤ Develop structures to deliver essential services on an equitable basis and develop education, religious and traditional authority organizations to imbue society with values of pluralism, diversity, tolerance, and compromise</li> <li>➤ Assist border discussions and demarcation where borders are in serious dispute</li> <li>➤ Fund exploration of options for land reform where current tenure is volatile</li> <li>➤ Encourage review of curriculum values inflammatory to integration, pluralism, intolerance of different "national-identities" within a political state</li> </ul>
<p><b>World Bank</b></p>	<p>Post-Conflict Unit</p>	<p><b>Objectives:</b></p> <p>To finance reconstruction and development in member countries. The Bank does not question the political character of a member and should not interfere in the domestic political affairs of a member.</p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Post-Conflict Unit (1997): watching brief in acute conflict situations, Transitional Support Strategy Process (TSS)</li> <li>➤ Post-Conflict Fund finances conflict analysis, early observation &amp; planning activities, post conflict reconstruction</li> <li>➤ Eligibility Criteria for Post-Conflict Assistance</li> <li>➤ Evaluation, Research, Staff Training</li> <li>➤ Assistance in demobilisation &amp; reintegration of combatants</li> </ul>



## Donor policy formulation in support of conflict prevention

Growing awareness of the need to tackle the root causes of violent conflict, and identification of triggers and accelerating factors, have also influenced recent conflict prevention policies. OECD-DAC has acknowledged that development assistance will have most impact in preventing conflict if it “addresses the root causes of violent conflict as well as the precipitating factors in ways which are relevant to local circumstances.”<sup>12</sup> Work within conflict prone or war-torn countries is now seen, within DAC, as an “integral part of the co-operation challenge”. This approach derives, in part, from recognition of the insupportable human and material costs of war, and presupposes that helping to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict creates a basis for sustainable development. The OECD-DAC members have advanced the growing understanding of conflict risks through redefining three significant root causes of conflict, namely:

- Imbalance of opportunities within society,
- Lack of effective and legitimate government,
- Absence of mechanisms for peaceful conciliation of different interests within society.

The European Union (EU) expands on the DAC approach by also describing the absence of vibrant civil society as a root cause of conflict. Importantly, both OECD-DAC members and the EU view root causes as being both the presence of specific factors (imbalance of opportunity and illegitimate governance) and the absence of certain factors which would mitigate conflict (absence of peaceful conciliation mechanisms, absence of vibrant civil society).

Significantly, the root causes identified do not specifically include security, arms flows, or the impact of external factors. However, OECD-DAC and the EU, among others, do consider these factors under the heading of triggering or accelerating factors.

### Accelerating and triggering factors

Events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict can be described as triggering or accelerating factors and may include:

- Economic decline
- Changes in the degree of internal state cohesion
- Shifts in internal control of central authority including the military
- Change in the internal distribution of power including access to governmental power and privilege
- Shipments of (small) arms
- Interventions of neighbouring states, regional powers and organisations
- Large movements of people and capital.<sup>13</sup>

Although not explicitly stated in the DAC guidelines, triggering and accelerating factors are dynamic and it is the significant change in a factor as well as the rapidity of its onset, rather than the mere presence or absence of a factor, which needs to be monitored. More recent attempts to understand triggers and accelerators have considered shifts in the expectations of populations and the degree to which those expectations are met.

In recognising the challenges for conflict prevention, the EU has now put forward a range of policy documents and resolutions which highlight:

- Recognition of the potential role of development co-operation if directed at the **root causes of conflict**
- The necessity of linking conflict warning to **early action**
- The need for **co-ordination** between different development actors
- The importance of **coherence** between different policy instruments
- The importance of **ownership** and support to capacity building for regional and national peace building initiatives

<sup>12</sup> OECD-DAC, *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 1998.

<sup>13</sup> OECD-DAC, *op cit.*

#### Selected EU conflict prevention policy documents and resolutions.<sup>14</sup>

- Conclusions on “Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping in Africa”. (Adopted by General Affairs Council on 4 December 1995)
- Communication from the Commission to the Council on “The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and beyond”. (6 March 1996)
- Resolution on Coherence of the EC’s Development Co-operation (Included within the Council Conclusions on the Dutch Presidency in June 1997)
- Common position and Council Conclusions on “Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa”. (Adopted by General Affairs Council in June 1997)
- EU Approach to Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution. (Included in the Development Council Conclusions of December 1998)
- Report to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission: Improving coherence and effectiveness of European Union action in the field of conflict prevention (December 2000)

Outside Europe, a number of governments and multilateral donors are developing approaches to conflict prevention. USAID has initiated a project whereby a “conflict lens” is used to plan projects in designated hot-spots. The approach taken includes an analysis of the relation between environmental stress and conflict which may now have to be considered in all country programmes. In the US, the financial, practical and political difficulties of responding to conflict led to a rethinking of approaches resulting in the formulation of preventive diplomacy policies.<sup>15</sup>

The World Bank has also responded to the growing complexity of conflict and aid provision and demands that its “programmes do not exacerbate conflict, and address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.” As a consequence, the Bank has developed a graded screening system for assessing projects which may impact negatively on conflict in countries at risk of violence. Assessment is recommended for projects with potential significant social impact and for those projects where significant changes of behaviour are expected. For countries in conflict, the Bank now undertakes “to design conflict-sensitive portfolios in countries where the Bank is active to mitigate conflict, and/or support activities towards conflict resolution.”

The UN, in recognising the need for clear means for the co-ordination of agencies in humanitarian emergencies, has developed a mechanism for co-ordination which includes 10 participating departments, programmes offices and agencies, The World Bank joined the Framework in February 2000.<sup>16</sup> The process aims to produce a swift and integrated UN system-wide response in the form of a comprehensive preventive action strategy to potential crises through information sharing, risk analysis, preparedness, action and follow-up.<sup>17</sup> According to an ODI report, the changes have been effective in facilitating information exchange, “but have not delivered the expected gains in terms of unified policy formulation.”<sup>18</sup>

The UN is currently elaborating a module on developing capacity for conflict analysis and strategic response. The module is one of four prepared for developing capacity building skills for conflict management in sub-Saharan Africa. They are intended to enhance Governments’ capacity to formulate strategies and programmes for early mitigation of conflicts.

One of these modules aims to develop an analytical framework for anticipating and understanding potential sources of conflict in order to develop strategic responses, and focuses on providing an analytical framework within which to: understand the causes and dynamics of conflict; develop skills for identifying, analysing and monitoring peace and conflict indicators; and develop skills for planning and integrating strategic approaches to peace building.

<sup>14</sup> Adapted from M Leonhardt, *Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries*, A Safer world and International Alert Publication, January 2000.

<sup>15</sup> M Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, 1996.

<sup>16</sup> UNDPA, *Framework for UN Agency Co-ordination Process for Countries in Crisis*.

<sup>17</sup> UNDPA, *op cit*.

<sup>18</sup> J Macrae & N Leader, *The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era*, Overseas Development Institute, July 2000.

## NGO responses on conflict prevention

NGOs are responding to the need to address conflict issues and their work is being supported by academic research and in-house experience. Operational and humanitarian NGOs such as Oxfam, Christian Aid, CARE-US and Merlin are just a few of the organisations attempting to operationalise concepts of peace building and conflict prevention in country strategies and programmes. International Alert and Saferworld are mapping progress made in this area by reviewing donor and NGO policies and practices, and through designing conflict analysis and programming tools for EU desk officers and decision makers.

Following on from the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, agencies have developed a comprehensive approach to minimum standards in emergency situations through the SPHERE project and through increased adherence to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Code of Conduct. For many humanitarian agencies, the use of minimum standards represents a clear commitment to ensuring that they consider the complex issues and dilemmas associated with providing assistance in political emergencies.

There is however, recognition that “humanitarian aid cannot be a substitute for political action,”<sup>19</sup> and researchers including staff at ODI are exploring this perspective. A review of policy coherence by Macrae and Leader asserts that far from developing a shared vision for aid, with respect to peace and security, there has actually been a “progressive diplomatic abandonment” as governments delegate “responsibility for political management into the aid sphere.”

### Liberia 1996

In an unprecedented move in 1996, agencies (including Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, Caritas and World Vision) refused to establish a major humanitarian operation in Liberia until improvements in security allowed the safe delivery of aid. In a situation of increasing insecurity, looting and diversion of aid the agencies agreed that only minimal life saving assistance should be given to the most vulnerable. “The warlords have used aid to fuel their war. They have looted aid vehicles and radio equipment to wage war on the very people it was intended to serve... Instead of saving lives our presence has contributed to the opposite.”<sup>20</sup>

The minimal assistance stance led to the drawing up of a code for agencies which ensured that aid would not serve the interests of warring parties. The recognition of the potentially negative impact of aid was a crucial factor in pushing forward an agenda which registered the need to find ways of providing humanitarian assistance without fuelling conflict.

The work of NGOs is also informed by the critiques and proposals of academics such as Mary Anderson and Jonathan Goodhand who have highlighted the negative impact of some, particularly humanitarian, interventions. For a number of operational international NGOs, the “Do No Harm” framework developed by Mary Anderson has provided a basis for shaping conflict impact assessment policies and practices. This approach identifies ways in which international humanitarian and development assistance can be provided so that rather than exacerbating conflict, aid helps local people to disengage from violence and develop systems for settling the problems which provoke conflict in their societies.

The Anderson model has allowed some agencies to link their practical experience to a conceptual framework which in turn has led to the development of new planning tools. CARE-US, for example, has based its Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) model on this approach and has tried to move beyond its somewhat limited scope to encompass the more challenging concept of maximising “net positive benefit”. In this case, the “Do No Harm / Local Capacities for Peace” philosophy has been integrated into a model which complements CARE’s other programming tools. The care methodology is described in detail in section 3 of this report.

<sup>19</sup> Joint evaluation of Emergency assistance to Rwanda, *The international response to Conflict and Genocide: lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, 1996

<sup>20</sup> David Bryer, Director Oxfam, 1996.

## Section 2

# The rationale for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodologies

Despite the increased attention to policy formulation and the multifarious efforts to mainstream peace building and conflict prevention through the establishment of institutional structures, donors are still some way from developing efficient, effective and coherent approaches to conflict management. The challenges for donors attempting to develop policies which address conflict prevention and peace building are substantial. Questions of capacity, resource allocation, political commitment, and the availability of coherent and effective instruments have to be addressed if conflict prevention is to shift from the theoretical to the practical realm. However, a range of approaches and methodologies are being developed which aim to help donors and agencies integrate conflict prevention objectives into the different levels and different stages of development co-operation, and to make decisions with respect to the design, timing and implementation of programmes and projects. These methodologies, initially referred to as conflict impact assessment tools (CIAs) were originally conceived to assess the impact of development projects and programmes on the social and political environment. Thus: Luc Reyckler aimed to assess the positive and negative impact of intervention on the dynamics of conflict.<sup>21</sup> CIA tools were later augmented to encompass peace-building objectives and are now more likely to be described as Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Tools or PCIA. Their development is based on the rationale that ongoing understanding of peace and conflict dynamics can lead to a discernible improvement in the quality of development and humanitarian assistance. Kenneth Bush, for instance, aimed to promote tools which could determine whether projects fostered sustainable “structures and processes for strengthening the prospects for peaceful co-existence and for decreasing the likelihood of the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict.”<sup>22</sup> PCIA approaches rely on assumptions about the nature, causes and dynamics of conflict; they attempt to systematise and present these assumptions in an accessible form, which can assist non-specialists in understanding complex situations.

**Impact assessment:** refers to the systematic analysis of the effects of an intervention on the social and physical environment; used to describe both ex-ante and ex-post studies of such effects.

**Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA):** planning, management and evaluation methodologies which help development and humanitarian assistance practitioners and policy makers mitigate conflict and reduce the unintended negative consequences of their engagement. More recently, the concept of CIAs has been expanded to encompass the range of activities which support peace, thus it is now more usual to refer to **Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment**, or PCIA<sup>23</sup>. PCIA conceptual frameworks attempt “to improve the design, conduct and evaluation of development work in conflict prone areas and provide a means for evaluating the potential for peace-building.”<sup>24</sup>

Early CIA tools tended to focus on ex-post evaluations of policy measures and were largely concerned with “measuring” the negative impact of development on conflict. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) developed the concept further - in responding to the imperative of demonstrable impact - and contributed insights on setting performance indicators for peace building.<sup>25</sup>

The first generation of CIA tools, largely indicator-based, gave way to more complex frameworks as demands expanded and policies became more complex. The EC, for instance, hoped that advanced CIA frameworks could assist practitioners to:

<sup>21</sup> L Reyckler, *Conflict Impact Assessment*, University of Leuven, 1998

<sup>22</sup> K Bush, *A Measure of peace*, IDRC 1998

<sup>23</sup> The term was first coined by Dr K Bush, *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*, paper number 1, 1998.

<sup>24</sup> K Bush, op cit.

<sup>25</sup> A Laprise for CIDA, *Programming for Results in Peace-building: Challenges and Opportunities for Setting Performance Indicators*, October 1998.

- identify key conflict problem areas
- identify instruments and measures which could address problem areas
- provide guidance on implementing measures
- set priorities for engagement
- evaluate priorities in terms of ameliorating conflict
- maximise opportunities for peace
- evaluate impact

It has not proved possible to design a tool to achieve such diverse objectives and so increasing efforts have been directed towards the development of “process approaches” and to the devising of tool boxes or resource packs with interconnected modules. The European Commission has produced a draft “Practical Guide on Peace Building and Conflict Prevention”, which is premised on a modular approach.<sup>26</sup>

More recently, the high profile role that the EU, OSCE and other international and regional organisations have taken on conflict, has led to a call for greater availability and applicability of tools and strategies.<sup>27</sup> In general, the tools and methodologies required by donors today need to fulfil specific national policy priorities and to encompass a range of functions including: analysis of potential conflict risks; early warning and early response; design of country assistance strategies in conflict-prone regions; sectoral and project planning; evaluation of impact; and analysis of the impact of conflict on development. These functions are outlined in more detail below.

#### **Some functions of PCIA tools**

**Conflict risk analysis (macro level):** Tools which derive from the conviction that sound conflict analysis can lead to a discernible impact on the quality of development assistance. An understanding of mechanisms for identifying and addressing the root causes of violent conflict is generally perceived as critical for planning and policy development.

**Early warning & early response tools (macro-micro levels):** Early warning indicators and frameworks which are designed to prompt specific actions and which take account of the very limited time-span in which decision-makers have to act and to co-ordinate activities.

**Strategic frameworks for assistance in conflict-prone regions (macro):** Frameworks premised on the belief that conflict prevention and peace-building in countries at risk of violent conflict need to be based on a thorough understanding of conflict risks. The frameworks may also address potential for enhancing coherence and co-ordination between different actors and instruments and for providing specific risk assessment.

**Sectoral programming tools (macro level):** Tools for implementing sectoral strategies built on a rigorous and incisive analysis of conflict risks. The support of resource management is an example of an area which is recognised as critical for long-term stability.

**Programme evaluation tools (macro-level):** Tools and frameworks for assessing, monitoring and mitigating the potential negative consequences of programmes in both latent and open conflict settings and for assessing the impact of engagement on national conflict risks.

**Project management instruments (micro level)** Frameworks and tools which provide an understanding of the range of actors and their interests in a specific conflict as well as options for promoting local capacities and opportunities for peace through development co-operation.

**Project monitoring and evaluation tools (micro level):** Tools for assessing, monitoring and mitigating the potential negative consequences of projects on both latent and open conflict at local level.

There is a growing appreciation among donors of the difficulties associated with applying these tools and frameworks. The difficulties derive from the diversity of war-torn societies, the uniqueness of approaches, the intrinsically political nature of conflict analysis, limited capacity and resources for this type of analysis and the constraints of funding and accountability frameworks.

<sup>26</sup> CPN publication, 1999.

<sup>27</sup> A Bjorkdahl, *Developing a Tool Box for Conflict Prevention*, Report on the Krusenberg Seminar, SIDA, September 2000.

## **NGOs and conflict-sensitive approaches to development and humanitarian assistance**

For NGOs, the impetus for best practice in conflict-prone and conflict-affected environments appears to be driven by the need to demonstrate greater effectiveness of programmes and to respond to the frequently expressed aspiration to build programmes based on localised understanding of conflict and poverty. This bottom-up approach is leading to the development of a range of methodologies and planning and evaluation processes which respond to the particular and individual needs of countries and regions, and reflect diverse organisational mandates and ways of working.

Although few attempts have been made to document these initiatives, it is clear that a substantial understanding of PCIA can be derived from an examination of the practice of agencies and NGOs working on the ground. This is true even though much of the work is happening outside the formal PCIA frameworks being developed by donors and academic institutions. Many NGOs increasingly recognise PCIA methodologies as part of larger efforts to mainstream conflict prevention and peace-building perspectives into programmes, to sensitise staff to conflict/peace dimensions of development and relief, and to enhance the analytical capacity of staff.

There are however concerns among some NGOs regarding the emphasis placed on tools and frameworks. There is a perception that donors may be using the PCIA approach as part of a new conditionality and that NGOs may be required to adopt particular donor frameworks in order to access funding. In addition, there is a fear among humanitarian agencies and think tanks that using humanitarian assistance to promote peace may, in practical terms, amount to using aid to promote political objectives. This would be in contravention of the humanitarian imperative that states that emergency relief should be provided impartially and on the basis of need alone. The risk of NGOs being seen as overtly political also has to be considered both in ethical terms and with regard to the risk of compromising the independence of NGOs.

Save the Children Fund (SCF) for example perceives that promoting peace can be seen to fit into the philosophy of relief delivery “which emphasises working through local structures and enhancing local capacities.”<sup>28</sup> However, in working in this way, organisations like SCF come into direct contact with those who promote war and this has the potential to undermine assistance programmes in very tense situations. These issues are pertinent for both policy makers and NGOs.

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<sup>28</sup> L Sida, SCF-UK

## Section 3

# Overview of conflict-sensitive approaches to development

International and indigenous humanitarian and development organisations, as well as policy think tanks and training institutions, have recognised the possible negative consequences of aid in conflict situations and have proposed ways to ensure that external engagement enhances the potential for sustainable benefits in countries at risk of violent conflict.

To this end a range of tools and methodologies have been developed with a view to enhancing development practitioners' analyses of the conflict risks inherent in a given country context. The tools and methodologies have often also been deployed to guide practitioners on the likely impact of their projects on conflict in politically fragile and emergency situations.

These early tools tended to be stand-alone checklists whereby a practitioner examined a range of conflict indicators and made a judgement as to the likelihood of the emergence of conflict. Through this process, the practitioner could determine whether a project should go forward, be amended, or be terminated. Later, tools for examining trends and stakeholder positions were developed as the need for early warning mechanisms expanded and practitioners embedded participatory methodologies within their programmes.

The desire for more sophisticated planning and evaluation tools and frameworks led to the refinement of additional perspectives for developing comprehensive analyses of peace and conflict. These largely analytical frameworks were designed to assist desk officers and practitioners in deriving concrete options for action. They guided the user to define concrete "conflict risks or problem areas", which could then be strategically addressed.

The range of tools and frameworks which have been developed can be categorised both according to the purpose for which they were designed and according to their typology. The following section attempts to lead practitioners through the range of extant tools and frameworks which have been designed to enhance conflict-sensitive development practices and policies. In this instance, tools have been categorised according to purpose with broad attention given to the design. The table provided in Appendix 1 is an attempt to highlight some of the latest approaches to PCIA frameworks used by donors and NGOs alike. It also provides a cursory assessment of strengths and weaknesses of various tools.

## Conflict analysis methodologies

### Indicator-based analytical tools used for macro level planning

A number of indicator-based tools have been developed over the last three years which aim to **assist planning and analysis for decision-makers and practitioners at national and regional level**. These tools and frameworks outline a range of political, economic and social indicators which, when combined, serve to present a comprehensive picture of the overall conflict risks in a given context. Such tools are most likely to be employed in macro-level planning to ascertain how development and humanitarian assistance can address the roots of violence.

The simplest of these approaches employ checklists, whereby a rating or score is attached to an indicator. The use of indicator-based tools with checklists gained support among a number of donors including the German Government, the World Bank and the EC. Angelika Spelten's work for the BMZ is premised on the identification of structural conflict factors, accelerating factors and triggering factors. The framework looks at four stages of conflict escalation, ranging from relative stability to civil war.

The tool is based on a number of hypotheses, including that the “more strongly a population group differs from other groups or feels itself to be the victim of discrimination, whether in fact or in its own perception, the greater the likelihood that its members will be prepared to act collectively to ensure that their interests are protected.” The Spelten tool requires that analysts give ratings to pre-defined indicators in order to calculate sectoral “risk” scores before arriving at an overall assessment of the potential for conflict. The tool, while providing some useful indicators for monitoring trends, is largely prescriptive and does not allow for systematic identification of strategies or options for engagement.

In 1998, The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) commissioned Saferworld and International Alert to develop a tool which could assist practitioners and desk officers in identifying significant “problem areas” that had the potential to lead to violent conflict in a given country. The tool was to be applied in particular, though not exclusively, to countries where tensions were apparent, but where a major crisis had not yet occurred. It was to be accessible to desk officers unfamiliar with peace-building and conflict prevention matters. Although the tool included a ranking system, it aimed to highlight macro-level conflict risks and to trigger appropriate action. It was based on the prevailing view in the Commission that virtually all measures could serve conflict prevention provided they were implemented effectively and coherently. The tool was broad enough to encompass the political, economic and social conditions which could underlie conflict, but was less rigorously focused regarding security issues. While it was designed to be comprehensive, this in effect, led to it being somewhat unwieldy. The tool did, however, have the advantage of being designed for a context in which conflict prevention was not perceived as an approach to sectoral policy but as one which needed to be mainstreamed into all policies in order to complement the EU’s other initiatives.

#### **Issue-based analytical tools for macro-level planning**

Issue-based frameworks (e.g. Bush 1998, Reyhler 1998) were designed to be more open-ended than indicator-based approaches and invited the user to explore context, systems, institutions, attitudes and forces for peace and conflict in order to reach strategic conclusions. The strategic analysis is linked to strategic options for action. In this approach, the user is expected to systematically consider the causes and manifestations of conflict in a given country in terms of major risks, including security, governance, economics and social and cultural factors. Some issue-based frameworks also look at the impact of external influences on conflict. The tools largely aim to provoke thought rather than apply prescriptive measurements of conflict risk. However, the tools have been criticised for being too restrictive and for ignoring the role and importance of local actors and parties to conflict.

The following table summarises indicator-based and issue-based approaches to conflict analysis used by the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), The World Bank, Canadian Fund for Peace, the Clingendael Foundation and the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).



**Table 2 : Indicator-based and issue-based approaches to conflict analysis**

Agency	Purpose	Identification of conflict risks/problem areas
CPN 1999	To prioritise development assistance in unstable situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Imbalance of political, social, economic and cultural opportunities</li> <li>➤ Non-democratic and ineffective governance</li> <li>➤ Absence of opportunities for the peaceful conciliation of group interests</li> <li>➤ Lack of an active and organised civil society</li> </ul>
Canadian Fund for Peace 1998	To analyse conflict trends	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Social indicators: demographic pressure, population movements, humanitarian emergencies, legacy of vengeance-seeking groups, behaviour, human flight.</li> <li>➤ Economic indicators: uneven economic development, sharp economic decline.</li> <li>➤ Political/military indicators: criminalisation/delegitimisation of the state, deterioration of public services, deterioration of human rights, violations of and/or suspension of rule of law, security apparatus as “state within state”, rise of factionalised elites, intervention of external political actors</li> </ul>
Engel/GTZ 2000	To identify the conflict potential in a country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Legacy of colonialism &amp; post-colonial rule</li> <li>➤ Inadequate governance</li> <li>➤ Imbalance of opportunities</li> <li>➤ Inadequate distribution and allocation of scarce resources</li> </ul>
World Bank 2000	To Identify <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ conflict risk</li> <li>➤ conflict intensity</li> <li>➤ performance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Security</li> <li>➤ Social cohesion</li> <li>➤ Economic performance</li> <li>➤ Governance</li> </ul>

**Indicator-based tools which link micro and macro level analysis**

Saferworld, among others, has attempted to develop a range of tools, based on case study research in the Horn of Africa, which specifically aim to assist country and regional desk officers and sector specialists, within both EU member state ministries and country representations. The tools are intended to assist in the design of comprehensive approaches to water resource management, and of post-conflict engagement which integrates conflict prevention and builds forms of engagement supportive of sustainable peace and development. The frameworks identify:

- the risks of violent conflict;
- indicators for gauging conflict risks;
- options for peace-building; and
- indicators for assessing the impact of peace-building policies.

The framework includes the key issues of conflict — governance, economics, socio-cultural aspects and security — and considers how these operate at local, district, national and sub-regional levels. The inclusion of policy options allows the framework to be more than just an analytical tool. The framework is informed by prior country and regional conflict analyses carried out to assess the wider peace-building environment within which sectoral engagement may take place. Assessment of the peace-building environment, it is suggested, should be complemented with a stakeholder analysis which considers both local and external actors and their stakes in conflict and peace, as well as identifying their respective peace-building capacities and comparative advantages.

### **Case study: conflict over scarce water resources and tools for the analysis of conflict**

Competition over diminishing water resources has been a cause of conflict at different levels within the Horn of Africa. In particular, water scarcity in Ethiopia has impacted on increasing food shortages and deepening poverty in parts of the country. Along with other countries in the region, Ethiopia has shown an interest in increasing its use of Nile water, but development has been constrained both by Egypt's resistance and donor reluctance to fund projects which affect downstream communities. Partly as a result of this, donors have tended to support large-scale, entirely domestic, water resource developments in Ethiopia, such as those in the Awash Valley region. These programmes have often ignored the needs of local communities and increased the risks of conflict between them.

Some attempts have been made by donors to address water resource problems through supporting smaller, community-based projects which stimulate the participation of local people in the planning and implementation of development projects. However, these efforts have been curtailed.

Saferworld has attempted to develop conflict indicator tools, to place water resource based conflicts in the broader context of socio-economic, political and cultural inequalities. Such tools, it is hoped, can help mainstream conflict prevention objectives into programme development and implementation. The indicator based analytical framework can assist in defining overall objectives of engagement, as well as prioritising focal areas and identifying a number of the risks inherent in engagement. Appendix 2 of this report includes a framework for resource development and conflict analysis in Ethiopia's Awash Valley.

### **Comprehensive approaches and frameworks for conflict-sensitive development**


Some of the indicator- and issue-based frameworks which have been developed by and for donors have limited relevance for the diverse situations in which development and humanitarian organisations have to operate. However, indicator approaches which seek to identify a range of conflict risks and propose policy options can have greater relevance in programme and project planning. Indicator-based approaches can assist at all stages of the project cycle from planning to evaluation, provided appropriate indicators and flexible approaches to interpretation are adopted. However, for development agencies with a long-standing presence within countries, and for those organisations working with or through local partners, the conflict-indicator-based framework can be augmented or replaced by other approaches and methodologies. For such organisations, more comprehensive process-based methodologies, often involving participatory approaches and including stakeholder analyses, are more viable and have greater potential for long-term impact.

A characteristic of "second generation" approaches to conflict analysis is the greater attention paid to process. Conflict analysis and programming tools are likely to have greater relevance — and be more representative of reality — if based on principles of ownership and participation. A variety of tools are being developed which provide a deep understanding of conflict typology, structural conflict causes, conflict stakeholders (including their agendas and capacities), and peace constituencies, and which identify opportunities for peace. Many tools have been developed by organisations engaged in conflict mediation efforts and conflict resolution training. The origin of these tools lies partly in the participatory planning and evaluation approaches practised by many NGOs and first advanced by Robert Chambers. In general, participatory methodologies focus on both structural sources of conflict, and people's attitudes and behaviours. Conflict-prevention and peace-building work, it is recognised, can only be sustainable if it involves, or at least reflects the needs and concerns of those affected by conflict. A participatory approach is therefore even more pivotal in conflicts than in traditional development contexts. Experiences with poverty impact assessment have shown that this method is most effective when it is implemented as a *participatory* planning and monitoring process over the whole project cycle (Goyden et al. 1998). In this way, projects can be better adapted to local needs and conditions. In conflict-affected situations, however, great sensitivity is required in handling participatory processes and much care must be taken to ensure that PCAs offer a *safe space*, in which different positions and demands can be heard.


In accordance with more process-oriented approaches, there is now a trend away from developing a single tool for conflict analysis towards a range of tools, which can be used at different stages of programme development and implementation processes. Such "tool boxes" contain modules for identifying stages of conflict, establishing time lines, mapping the root causes of conflict, undertaking stakeholder analysis and identifying peace constituencies. Amongst donors, the Clingendael Center has developed a conflict framework for the Dutch Government.

# A Schematic Overview of the Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework Clingendael

## A CONFLICT AND POLICY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE



Although most work to date has been undertaken in the area of strategic conflict analysis and planning, it is recognised that conflict-sensitive tools are required to support the full programme and project cycle from analysis to implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Responding to Conflict (RTC), a British-based NGO, has characterised the main stages to be informed by a conflict perspective in the following way. Source: RTC 2000



RTC has derived its methodologies from a number of sources, however it gives credence to the work of Mary Anderson. In providing training to conflict-prevention and peace-building practitioners, RTC covers a range of activities including conflict analysis, policy influence and direct negotiation. It has been able to draw on the "Do No Harm" framework while also synthesising direct local experience and practical examples into their methodology and training.

#### **Participatory approaches to peace-building**


A community based project in Wajir in northern Kenya, largely led by elders and women, has sought to reduce tensions and to create an environment for reconciliation following a number of killings. Wajir district endured political exclusion, limited resources, constant drought and ethnic, religious and clan divisions. Violent conflict was a constant threat. The local peace initiative, which was supported by Oxfam and RTC, was able to identify some of the structural problems, and in turn effect changes in local administration, policing, drought preparedness and inclusive local structures. The Department for International Development in Kenya is now developing a conflict management project in northern Kenya and its thinking in this regard has been informed by the lessons of the Wajir project.

A second approach which has gained widespread recognition has been undertaken by the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) in Somalia. The approach, which links local participatory research to workshops involving participation of decision makers and communities, is attempting to address conciliation in a post-conflict environment. WSP, besides providing a forum for discussion, debate and consultation, implicitly recognises that peace building is a process which needs to build trust and confidence. In this case it may not immediately and directly address root causes. To this end WSP has looked at the problems faced and created by armed youth, the issue of gender and rights, and that of literacy and education. The UNDP office for Somalia, based in Nairobi is looking at some of the lessons from WSP in developing its protection programme.

### Project cycle frameworks

CARE-US methodology, premised on the principles of participatory decision-making and information sharing, is aimed at all those involved in programme design, monitoring and evaluation at both field and country office level. In terms of analysis it also includes counterparts such as donors, other aid actors and clients. It represents an attempt to integrate a conflict assessment framework into the project planning and evaluation process.

#### The CARE framework:




While the "Do No Harm" methodology has provided impetus to some organisations and has influenced the nature of their development and humanitarian programmes, many organisations have opted to address conflict prevention through enhanced approaches to planning and implementation. Agencies such as Oxfam have used both field experience and analytical frameworks to push for more effective programmes. For Oxfam, the key aim in conflict-prone areas is to demonstrably base programmes "upon high quality analysis which is sensitive to social diversity and draws upon the best available local, national and international information." Oxfam has been able to link demands for more effective programming to analytical frameworks developed by Michael Wamer and others. Oxfam's approach also gives recognition to the range and depth of field experience of staff and seeks to build on that knowledge and to include local partners and stakeholders in planning and evaluation of its development programmes. For example, over the last three years, Oxfam has attempted to build a conflict prevention perspective into project planning in its Sudan programme. A range of training and capacity building initiatives have taken place with staff, partners and government officials and this had led to the identification of opportunities for more effective programmes. Oxfam is currently piloting a PCIA process, details of which are provided below. Critically for organisations like Oxfam, who are also engaged in advocacy and policy dialogue, field practice is complemented by campaigning, publications and dialogue with northern and southern policy makers.

#### Integrated programmes for conflict-sensitive development

Oxfam in its Sudan programme was able to work with RTC to train its national staff in analysing conflict and power relations and to assess the impact of unintended consequences of development programmes. Furthermore, staff learned to assess opportunities for more proactive engagement with communities and individuals working to mitigate conflict, and to shift programming towards root causes of conflict. The exercise identified lack of democracy and participation as fundamental to the political crisis in the north of Sudan. The explicit recognition of root causes enabled the programme to make decisions about how to shift programme objectives. Accordingly, they addressed rights and democracy issues, especially at grass roots levels among community based organisations.

Oxfam's programmes in the Horn of Africa are now based on the need to respond to underlying causes of political instability and exclusion, as such individual projects are more likely to recognise rights, participation, equity and gender equality as essential to achieving project goals.

## Oxfam model (draft)



International Alert too has embarked on projects in support of enhancing the peace-building impact of development NGOs. Its Guatemala project in collaboration with Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES) provides valuable insights. The project aims to identify priority needs, to build on existing good practice, and to establish knowledge about PCIA. It prioritises understanding of local contexts and the development of tools which can be adapted by individual agencies. To this end, a conflict 'mapping' exercise was undertaken in which over fifty organisations were interviewed and expert meetings held to gather feedback and provide direction to the project. In addition to documenting and sharing experience, a list of conflict indicators specific to Guatemala was developed. This was then available to be used by other organisations in their planning processes.

### Lessons learned from Guatemala

The project found that current practice in terms of integrating peace-building goals and priorities within development planning was in need of enhancement. Although there was a desire to use PCIA methodologies, it was agreed that they could not be too prescriptive, but should be based on existing good practice relevant to local contexts. There was a general level of scepticism about the utility of a 'one size fits all' PCIA tool. In this regard, the derivation of conflict indicators, validated through consultation, was thought to be an effective way of promoting conflict sensitivity for organisations in Guatemala. This was seen as preferable to the development of more complex PCIA methodologies which would take considerable time to develop, and which risked being too cumbersome in the opinion of Guatemalan organisations.

- **The importance of the process and general awareness raising:** The process of bringing organisations together to discuss the relationship between development practice and conflict was seen as important to agencies in terms of acquiring a better understanding of how they could operationalise conflict-sensitive planning. PCIA methodologies, it was found, needed to be informed by existing ways of working and good practice if they were to gain the confidence of practitioners in the field.
- **Appreciation of the role of externalities and PCIA:** In improving the peace-building impact of development NGOs it was noted that the development of PCIA tools could only be a partial response to an existing lack of conflict awareness. External constraints also impact on the effectiveness of NGO operations and the external environment consequently 'impacts' on PCIA methodologies and on the eventual quality of programmes. PCIA methodologies may point to particular choices for development planning that may be at odds with external realities. For example a PCIA methodology may suggest the need for long-term low-level engagement, whereas donor funding modalities may be geared towards short-term high-impact demands.
- **Time-scale of the development of PCIA:** The most effective PCIA methodologies and related working practices are developed through a participatory process supported by long-term engagement with organisations on the ground. Unless PCIA methodologies are seen to be relevant and workable by organisations (primarily through their input in development), they will not actually be used by practitioners. Therefore, long-term local engagement is required to assist in the development, refinement and operationalisation of PCIA methodologies.

A comprehensive planning approach is also being pursued by some donors. The World Bank, for example, now bases its programmes on analysis modules for implementation of policy instruments. The modules include: conflict analysis, design of conflict-sensitive portfolios, tools for addressing the root causes of conflict and the legacy of violence, and an assessment of the transition to peace.

**Table 3: World Bank instruments for engagement with countries affected by violent conflict**

Stage of conflict	Objectives	Instruments	Tools
Countries at risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ To assess the country's proneness to conflict</li> <li>➤ To design conflict-sensitive portfolios that can help mitigate and/or address root causes of conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Country Assistance Strategy</li> <li>➤ Country Portfolio Performance Review</li> </ul>	At Risk Indicators
Countries in conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ To design conflict-sensitive portfolios in those countries where the Bank is active to mitigate conflict, and/or support activities towards conflict resolution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Inactive Portfolio: Watching Brief</li> <li>➤ Active Portfolio: Country Assistance Strategy, Country Portfolio Performance Review</li> </ul>	Conflict Intensity Indicators
War/peace transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ To identify proneness to re-emergence of conflict and to design a portfolio that can help address underlying causes and mitigate possible outbreaks of conflict</li> <li>➤ To address the legacy of violent conflict, e.g. displacement, militarisation, weak governance</li> <li>➤ To assess the country's transition to peace following peace settlements or political agreements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Transition Support Strategy</li> <li>➤ Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (for IDA allocation)</li> </ul>	Performance Indicators
All countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ To ensure that the Bank's programmes do not exacerbate conflict, and do address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Country Assistance Strategy</li> <li>➤ Country Portfolio Performance Review</li> </ul>	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

Adapted from Cleves/Sambanis 2000

## Early warning and early response methodologies

The development of early warning tools and methodologies has received comparatively high levels of attention and support among donors and institutions. Early warning methodologies should provide time for planning and implementation of responses as well as providing analysis of conflict dynamics in order to identify entry points for action and should, finally, generate political will. Central to all early warning methodologies is a focus on the need for information-sharing and robust analysis. The information, which leads to an analysis of pre-defined indicators, should also be able to generate a prognosis and lead to early action. Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)'s methodology involves the collection and analysis of information on potential and actual conflict situations, and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace.

The tool follows certain steps for early warning, including the following:

- **Context analysis** : a descriptive analysis of geographic and historical factors, key actors and agendas
- **Identification of conflict indicators**: such as political, economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors
- **Situation analysis**: classifying indicators into structural factors, accelerators, triggers, synergies and mitigating factors
- **Identification of opportunities for peace**: searching for windows of opportunity in terms of events, mediators, facilitators, options and agenda items



## Monitoring and evaluation frameworks

In both conflict-prone and more stable environments, impact and evaluation tools need to be based on shared aims, objectives and expectations of what each group (donor/partner, constituent communities and relevant authorities) is trying to do. Many evaluations confirm that differing objectives and expectations make impact assessment problematic. Although the identification of base-lines for conflict assessment is not necessarily feasible, and qualitative exercises are not always realistic, information gathering is possible. In the violent dashes in Kenya in the mid-nineties, local relief committees had a lot of information about displacement and were able to build up a comprehensive picture of the problems through sharing that information.<sup>29</sup> In dire emergency situations, people may be too traumatised at the start and the NGOs too over-stretched but that does change over time. Attribution of impact is always difficult but it is important to look at processes and people as well as outputs. Often it is only possible to track changes and it is important to be prepared for unanticipated impacts. For example, Oxfam supported credit and income generation programmes in Chad for women widowed in the civil war. The evaluation revealed that income generated had enabled women to regain their status in society. It was not the immediate objective of the donor, but it served the broader objective of rebuilding the community for those who had become excluded by reason of their status and poverty.<sup>30</sup>

Christian Aid, a British based organisation, while not explicitly undertaking PCIA, has, within its regional programmes, recruited policy advisers who are responsible for linking field practice to policy formulation. For East Africa and the Great Lakes region, a conflict specialist has been appointed to ensure that programmes reflect conflict analysis and objectives, and aim to maximise opportunities for peace. Through working with partners who look at conflict and security issues, Christian Aid is building up a body of knowledge and experience which is based on local realities. Its support to groups like the Nairobi Peace Initiative and the National Council of Churches of Kenya, among others, is aimed not just at peace building activities but also at the evaluation of impact. Christian Aid's approach draws on the conflict prevention work undertaken by John Paul Lederach. His outcome-indicator approach is based on the assumptions that peace is rarely linear, peace initiatives are dynamic, and all approaches need to adapt to an ever-changing context. In responding to these assumptions, Lederach defines three sets of indicators, namely output indicators, outcome indicators and process indicators which can be applied to evaluation models.

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<sup>29</sup> Bridget Walker, RTC pers comm.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*

### **Case study: Christian Aid and NCKK monitoring and evaluation**

*The National Council of Churches for Kenya (NCKK) has been able to draw some valuable lessons from its peace and reconciliation programme in Kenya which are relevant to the development of conflict impact assessment tools. The NCKK's efforts in Kenya's politically volatile Rift Valley have shown that in spite of political impediments, it is possible to ameliorate violence and to undertake programmes aimed at sustaining peace. The NCKK, with support from Christian Aid, is now developing indicators which should allow it to monitor and evaluate the impact of its programme on conflict.*

In 1992, the NCKK registered over 300,000 displaced people following violent ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley. Although the NCKK initially provided immediate relief support to victims, it determined that it was essential to investigate the nature and origin of the clashes in order to assist in averting future violence. NCKK analysis indicated that although the clashes were politically inspired, they were compounded by social and economic disparities at the community level. As a result of its research, the NCKK initiated a programme which tried to address the root causes of conflict through peace and reconciliation activities including public meetings, farm rehabilitation, provision of farm inputs and assistance in resettlement. As the programme progressed, staff became increasingly involved in village level mediation, participatory conflict analysis and interactive activities for particular groups, especially women and youth. In later phases it was able to include village leaders, councillors and Members of Parliament. However, a presidential statement insinuating that the NCKK was subversive adversely affected the relationship with the local government.

The impact of the NCKK programme has been difficult to measure, but clashes have been averted. In 1997, during elections, the NCKK project areas were free from violence, despite widespread strife in neighbouring areas. Recognising the difficulty of attributing success and measuring impact, the NCKK, with Christian Aid, has developed an approach to monitoring and evaluation based on a series of process and outcome indicators.

The indicators are based on one major assumption, namely that the NCKK is making a contribution to reduced levels of conflict. Each NCKK activity is now underpinned by an aim, an assumption, process indicators and outcome indicators. For example the Area Structure Development project aims to enhance community participation and ownership and create early warning systems.

It is based on the **underlying assumption** that community ownership increases the effectiveness and sustainability of peace initiatives as well as the capacity for early response.

**Process indicators:** regular meetings and participation of communities; increased capacity for self-driven initiatives.

**Outcome indicators:** multiplicity of peace animators; constant flow of information; reporting of conflicts; liaisons with government; churches, etc; increase in number of incidents resolved locally.

To date, few attempts have been made to evaluate the impact of conflict prevention and peace-building activities among donors. It is widely recognised that single projects or programmes cannot bring about peace and reconciliation. Moreover, peace-building is a long-term process, which may take many years to be achieved. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to define appropriate timelines for evaluation. Nevertheless, there is a desire to understand the impact of initiatives which are aimed at preventing conflict or building peace. Several donor countries have already begun to undertake country-level, programme-level and project-level evaluations to generate more systematic insights into the impacts of their development assistance in conflict contexts. For example, Norway and Germany have each produced in-depth case studies in selected countries. Meanwhile, CIDA is currently undertaking an evaluation of its Peace-building Fund to assess its relevance, appropriateness, cost-effectiveness and sustainability.

## Evaluation of Canadian Peace-building Fund: Indicators for Project Results

### I. Conditions leading to sustainable peace situations established with project activities in conflict-affected countries and regions

Conflict prevention: established and functional crisis management procedures, reduction in reported incidents of violence and human rights violations

Conflict resolution: institutionalised training programmes in conflict resolution and confidence building, evidence of community co-operation and joint problem sharing on contentious issues

Peace consolidation: war crimes tribunals, reconciliation and reintegration procedures, human rights and democratisation training

### II. Peace-building project support had a catalytic effect in energising local peace activities

Development of traditional conflict management skills and small community-based peace-building projects based on culturally-specific customs and procedures

Wider citizen-participation and democracy-building at local level

Source: CIDA 2000

## Humanitarian approaches

Humanitarian action, it is now recognised, is a highly political activity, which relies on engagement with "political authorities in conflict-affected countries, and thus influences the political economy of conflict."<sup>31</sup> Agencies often have to walk the difficult path between responding to need and dealing with the conflicting interests of different actors, as well as juggling different donor policies and demands. A number of principles and charters guide humanitarian engagement; most important among these are impartiality and the humanitarian imperative. Above all, the principles allow agencies to separate their activities from the partisan interests of warring parties but also from the "foreign policy interests of other states."<sup>32</sup>

Save the Children Fund, while not undertaking formal conflict impact assessment methodologies, relies heavily on local analysis for improved and effective programming. Its food aid programme in South Sudan, for example, is based on an in-depth vulnerability study which examines local social structures and relations, local power relationships and baseline measures of need and vulnerability.

A special adviser based in the SCF Emergencies Unit is developing a peace-building concept paper which critiques the notion that aid can promote peace. The paper, which is still in draft form and does not reflect organisation policy, recognises that good analysis, working to enhance local capacities, and developing moral and technical standards assist in making programme judgements and decisions. Furthermore, it asserts that the work being done around peace building can improve analysis but should not detract from the humanitarian imperative. SCF sees an implicit danger in replicating peace building processes and is therefore likely to continue to adopt an approach which looks in depth at individual situations and makes strategic decisions based on analysis and experience, taking account of the views of a range of stakeholders. An SCF case study shows how humanitarian assistance, based on the principles of neutrality and local ownership as well as adherence to the humanitarian imperative to provide relief on the basis of need, can contribute to peace and stability.

<sup>31</sup> Macrae, J & Leader, N, *The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era*, ODI, July 2000.

<sup>32</sup> Macrae, J & Leader, N. op cit.

### **Case Study : Save the Children Fund — Peace-building in Bunyakiri, Eastern DRC**

*The engagement of SCF in the conflict area of Bunyakiri was initially solely relief provision. However, thanks to an understanding of the causes of the conflict and to a strategy of building local ownership of solutions, SCF and the local community were able to engage in processes of stability building and – drawing on the principles of neutrality and the humanitarian imperative – to contribute to local-level peace.*

Bunyakiri, located in south Kivu, is under the control of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). The communities occupying the region include the Batemb, Berongorange, Bash, Bahavu and other groups. There is a history of dispute over land ownership in the area among different communities, in particular between local Congolese inhabitants and Rwandese immigrants who came during the colonial period.

Actors in the present conflict are RCD soldiers and the Rwandese army (RPA) on one side, and the Mayi-Mayi with the Interahamwe on the other. In 1998, the RCD revolted against Kabila's regime. The Mayi-Mayi, who see the Rwandese as invaders, initiated a war against the RPA. They also oppose Congolese who support the RCD.

At the heart of the conflict are issues of sovereignty, nationality, land ownership, fear of foreign domination and Rwanda's fear of Interahamwe insurgency. Conflict is compounded by the presence of diamonds and a deadly war economy.

SCF-UK became involved in the area because of the dire humanitarian situation. Staff met community and church leaders as well as displaced people who described their experience and the impact of conflict on their lives. Bunyakiri had been completely isolated by the war, making it impossible for any NGOs to operate there. SCF was the first international organisation to access the area in three years. Importantly, the community saw SCF as a neutral actor who could bear witness to their plight as well as provide medical supplies and emergency food and fulfil other vital needs of vulnerable groups.

With some improvement in their condition, the community began to discuss how to secure existing aid as well as attracting more relief to the area. They identified the lack of security and peace as the main obstacle to attracting assistance to the area. Accordingly, local leaders started to explore mediation possibilities between warring groups and to undertake confidence building exercises.

SCF continues to visit the area and to discuss peace and security. It has organised seminars to educate the community, and workshops to promote cohabitation and security, and provided technical and material support for national NGOs involved in peace and reconciliation work. While aware of the need to respond to extreme need, SCF is also cognisant of the impact of aid which has the potential to create dependency and which can be manipulated for political ends.

## Section 4

### Critical assessments and conclusions

A number of significant issues will need to be considered if there is to be real progress in making peace and security achievable development objectives and if PCIA are to provide the tools and mechanisms currently available to donors and NGOs. Besides the fundamental issues of coherence and adherence to human rights norms, donors and practitioners alike will have to consider issues of co-ordination, capacity building and mainstreaming among others. Critical issues are outlined below.

#### Cross-cutting issues

PCIA have a key role to play in conflict prevention and peace-building. Nonetheless, it is critical that they should not be perceived to be a substitute for political action. If donors are serious about conflict-sensitive approaches to aid, then policies have to be developed across the full range of instruments and implemented in a coherent and efficient manner.

##### Coherence

Effective peace-building requires coherence across the full range of external policy instruments and attempts have been made, for example within the EU, to increase coherence between development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, and investment policies. However, the lack of donor coherence is a serious issue, especially in humanitarian emergencies. Incoherence can stem from the inconsistencies of policies both between and within donor agencies. However it can also result from lack of co-ordination. There is still a wide divergence among donors as regards their progress on development and conflict issues. Donors have disparate policies and priorities and have reached different stages of both policy development and operationalisation of those policies. There is also variety in the interpretation of the major issues which inform policy, for example security and conditionality. This also impedes progress towards coherence, co-ordination, on-going dialogue, and ultimately the impact and effectiveness of engagement. It is therefore important that donors ensure that all relevant ministries participate in policy development and implementation. This is vital if conflict prevention policies and practices are to be mainstreamed into the full range of policy instruments at a donor's disposal. The use of conflict-sensitive approaches should not be restricted to development assistance but should include "political" instruments such as targeted sanctions, trade tariff policies, arms export controls and diplomatic measures.

The development of appropriate instruments will require a much deeper analysis of conflict contexts and a greater understanding of the limited role that Official Development Assistance (ODA) alone can play in the absence of complementary foreign policy instruments and of political commitment. Donors could, as part of enhancing coherence and co-operation, establish national compliance units which could play a positive and supporting role in aligning donor practice in conflict-prone and conflict-affected countries. In view of this, the OECD-DAC task force is encouraged to establish a unit charged with monitoring and supporting the implementation of DAC Guidelines by member states. Such a unit could also play an important role in encouraging coherence and monitoring co-ordination.

##### Human rights versus peace building

A further salient issue, which has yet to be investigated in depth, is the impact of peace building and conflict prevention on access to and achievement of human rights. Many PCIA frameworks acknowledge that widespread and increasing abuses of human rights are important indicators of conflict and early warning. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that peace should be commensurate with access to human rights and justice. However, there is less certainty as to how this can be achieved in practice. There is an apparent dilemma. Assisting people to access their basic rights may bring about an increase in social conflict. This issue has particular relevance to Latin America where the achievement of rights was a driving force for conflict and ultimately social

change. For development to be conflict-sensitive it must also be politically sensitive. Yet if there are restrictions placed on political dialogue at non-state level, PCAs may inadvertently reinforce an unjust status quo. PCAs therefore need to address human rights and the concerns of minority groups from the outset.

Another germane manifestation of the tensions between human rights and peace building is the impunity of war criminals versus their inclusion in reconciliation processes. For the benefit of short-term peace it may make sense to bring warlords and rebels into peace negotiations and transitional governments. However, there may be a danger that the failure to address impunity could exacerbate the cycle of violence and thus impede the achievement of sustainable peace. There is a need therefore for donors and human rights agencies to:

- Adopt approaches which strike the right balance between advancement of human rights and achievement of stability. The aim should be establishment of sustainable development and a just peace based on the principles of agreed Human Rights Conventions and acknowledging the priorities of oppressed peoples.
- Ensure that injustice and inequality are not entrenched through external engagement. It is therefore essential that in inequitable situations, development projects, trade programmes and investment address justice and rights issues.

## **Policy instruments and issues**

### **Humanitarian aid and conflict**

There is a concern that humanitarian instruments in complex emergencies can be manipulated to influence the behaviour of warring parties, possibly undermining the humanitarian imperative. The distribution of aid must be on the basis of need, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and not according to its likely impact on conflict dynamics. This is a sensitive issue and needs to be debated and understood if clear instruments for political action and humanitarian aid are to be effectively deployed. Respect for international humanitarian law must be a prerequisite in aid disbursement strategies, and donor and NGO approaches to provision of relief in this context must take the humanitarian imperative as the baseline for intervention. Humanitarian action is highly political and tensions will exist between responding to immediate need of civilians and dealing with the opposing interests of parties to the conflict. It is essential that:

- Humanitarian assistance is distributed on the basis of established humanitarian need and not according to its likely impact on conflict dynamics.
- Donors and humanitarian actors recognise the limitations of humanitarian assistance in complex political emergencies and undertake to find political solutions at the same time as providing relief. In addition, that they investigate the various means of providing humanitarian assistance in ways that minimise the chances of humanitarian aid directly benefiting warring parties.
- Reviews and evaluations of humanitarian intervention are widely undertaken to illuminate more explicitly the links between aid and conflict. These findings need wide dissemination in order to influence practice.
- Relationships with humanitarian NGOs are enhanced in order that minimum standards and adherence to humanitarian principles are operationalised more effectively. This may necessitate greater attention to the issue of compliance and to ensuring that adequate resources are made available for mainstreaming best practice and implementing codes of conduct.

### **Development co-operation and mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches**

The new conditionality on “poor performing” countries, being adopted by some donors, could mean that rather than conflict-prone countries receiving assistance which helps to mitigate risk, more countries will be excluded from receiving development assistance. This position is reflected

in the EC's development policy.<sup>33</sup> Trying to increase the effectiveness of development assistance is a necessary precondition for poverty eradication and security. However, new policy frameworks will have to be carefully developed to ensure that countries at risk of conflict, or those that do not meet the criteria for assistance, are not disadvantaged. It is vital that donors engage with governments who are willing but unable to meet criteria, and assistance should be targeted to help in this way. For those governments that do not demonstrate the political will to meet criteria, it is recommended that donors seek innovative ways to channel development assistance through non-state actors to help to create the conditions for sustainable development.

Furthermore, current aid systems themselves may need to be assessed in order to determine the impact of current development and trade partnerships on structural causes of conflict. PCIA and conflict prevention concepts need to expand the focus of debate beyond issues of "state failures" and institutional collapse or weakness. There is a need to understand the international policies and structures which may contribute to failure and political breakdown.

As it is still unclear how development assistance can best promote conflict prevention, it is crucial that further evaluations and research are undertaken. These could assess how the range of aid instruments can be broadened to engage "poor performing countries." Importantly, this will require changes to current budget lines in order that development assistance is provided even during conflict and complex political emergencies. Conflict assessment frameworks should be part of comprehensive attempts to mainstream conflict prevention. Mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches may involve:

- Reviewing the impact of aid and trade systems, especially of globalisation and structural adjustment policies on conflict and inequity.
- Appointing dedicated conflict policy advisers for regions with high incidences or risks of violent conflict who can encourage the integration of conflict prevention perspectives into the promotion of more effective programming.
- Strengthening the co-ordination between ministries and departments across donor governments in order to ensure coherence and the appropriate use of instruments and rigorous political analysis.
- Encouraging the participatory identification and monitoring of conflict and programme performance indicators. The ultimate aim must be to enhance practice.

### **Security and conflict**

Recognition that physical security is a necessary precondition for development has become an important motivating factor in the development of security sector reform (SSR) policies as part of donor engagement. SSR involves the reform of key state institutions including the judiciary, the police, the army and prisons. For many donors however, there are political difficulties which prevent the introduction of SSR as part of development assistance and this has implications for coherence of approaches among donors and across instruments. For example, many European governments house security policy development within ministries of defence and difficulties arise in shifting resources and policy development into ministries of foreign affairs or international development. While it is understood that in fragile post-conflict scenarios, the army and security forces need to be demobilised and reintegrated into new structures, there is often insufficient donor commitment to fund such programmes. Donors should consider that security sector reform is a legitimate area for donor support and ensure sufficient resources for these programmes. Donors are urged to:

- Review their current policies with respect to security and governance programmes and to bring them in line with the conceptual framework being proposed by the DAC Task Force. The Task Force needs to develop interpretative guidelines to assist member states in the implementation of SSR assistance. Implementation needs to be monitored and evaluated to encourage compliance and to assure donors that assistance is used to support development objectives.

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<sup>33</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, April 2000.

## **Institutional issues**

### **Implementation and piloting**

Much effort has gone into the design and development of PCIA tools. However, there is very little to suggest that there has been widespread or effective implementation of methodologies, or that the use of tools has had an impact on conflict prevention. This is due largely to the fact that tools are still embryonic in nature and have yet to be rigorously tested.

A second finding in this respect is that despite the range and depth of work being undertaken in PCIA and related methodologies, little attempt has been made to instigate pilot projects which specifically look at the impact of those methodologies. The nascent work being undertaken on process and outcome indicators by NGOs may provide valuable baseline lessons. It is therefore imperative that donors and institutions undertake processes of testing and piloting and of supporting civil society initiatives in this regard. This is a crucial procedure: the dangers of recommending methodologies and tools to agencies and NGOs before there has been an evaluation of those mechanisms are substantial.

Thirdly, the approaches described above need to be developed and rigorously applied in national settings, with the full participation of local stakeholders. The objective should be to develop approaches which are tailored to local needs and priorities. Local ownership is crucial if the process of implementation is to be driven by local concerns. Thus, dialogue is fundamental to ensuring effective application.

Host governments and southern civil society have been largely absent from the design and implementation of tools, frameworks and approaches for peace and conflict-sensitive development practice. These approaches have primarily emerged from northern academic and policy institutions in co-operation with donor governments and multilateral institutions, with little space given to national governments and to indigenous approaches and southern perspectives.

PCIA tools and methodologies must provide more than an analytical lens and policy instruments. They must presuppose sustainable methodologies for ongoing gathering and monitoring of information, both at the level of policy makers and of communities and this may be necessary over an extended period of time, and not simply to check on "impact" but to ensure learning and the establishment of necessary knowledge for the ongoing improvement of micro and macro responses.

- Donors need to ensure that the design and implementation of approaches to peace and conflict-sensitive development occur with the full collaboration of actors from northern and southern perspectives, but particularly acknowledging the role of host governments.
- There is a need for donors to invest in the development and application of the range of tools, through selective pilot initiatives which ultimately lead to mainstreaming of policy and objectives.
- There is a specific need for further development of evaluation tools and indicators for conflict resolution and peace building. Innovative approaches are required because standard approaches to evaluating development projects may be inappropriate for assessing their impact on peace building.

### **Capacity and resources**

Research indicates that the development of targeted and comprehensive approaches to peacemaking and peace-building is being hampered by the lack of institutional structures which can link different policy instruments (military, trade, policy dialogue, development aid, humanitarian assistance), both within and between donor agencies (COWI 1997). Although a number of institutions have been established both within and outside government structures to take forward issues of conflict prevention and peace-building, there are fears, and limited evidence, that these systems may be side-lined from mainstream decision-making processes.

In addition, the development of tools and methodologies without a concurrent commitment to



skills training and capacity building needs to be addressed. The EU for example, while developing tools, has been unable thus far to find resources to complete the development of a practitioners' guide or to provide funding for staff training. The lack of adequate resources being allocated to conflict prevention is part of a larger problem — the prioritisation of short-term crisis response.

Despite the progress made in the development of PCIA, there has been little effort made among donors to mainstream conflict prevention and peace-building objectives within programmes. More could also be done to improve conflict analysis capacity within organisations, and to train staff in conflict prevention and peace-building skills. Therefore, donors could:

- Share and jointly discuss country strategy papers and programme evaluations, where conflict is an issue, as a means of promoting lessons learned and to support the peace-building initiatives and capacities of host governments, who have been largely absent from the development of these policies and programmes.
- Attempt to decentralise donor assistance so that delegations have more responsibility for country level strategy development. This will require the development of capacity of delegations in support of conflict-sensitive development policies and practices.

### **Co-ordination and co-operation**

There is a need for improved co-ordination between donors as this weakness has been a major factor in the failure to develop appropriate development assistance. Incoherent policies have, on occasions, resulted in donor engagement undermining efforts specifically targeted to address the underlying causes of conflict.

In order to react to situations of conflict in a more timely manner and with more appropriate instruments, donor agencies also need to be able to facilitate the flow of information between the field, country delegations and headquarters. This is particularly important for early warning. Conflict assessment exercises can build a common understanding of conflict situations and assist in the development of a strategic framework for action, while leaving space for diverse actors to decide on their particular contribution. Enhanced co-operation would also assist in preventing the multiplication of research efforts such as data gathering, consultation, and planning workshops. This is particularly important in conflict-prone situations as it reduces the burden placed on fieldworkers and local partners in terms of research and consultation. Co-operation in information gathering and analysis still leaves space for all participants to arrive at their own considered conclusions. Donors need to prioritise:

- Co-operation with NGOs: Governments and NGOs can bring complementary strengths in terms of access to information, data processing and analytical capacity. The strength of donor agencies lies in their capacity to deal with macro-level structural data and their comprehensive view on a country situation. NGOs, on the other hand, have developed strong skills in participatory approaches and stakeholder consultations.
- The inclusion of additional perspectives: Donors and NGOs not only have distinct capacities in terms of accessing information and analysis, they also bring different perspectives into PCIA exercises. Their specific links to different conflict stakeholders allow the establishment of comprehensive analyses. This permits agencies to support peace processes, which better reflect the interests of those most affected by violence.
- Strengthening micro-macro linkages: Co-operation between donors, NGOs and conflict-affected communities allows policies and activities to become part of broader strategic plans. This increases the likelihood that micro-level initiatives will translate into tangible results at the macro-level.
- Support for civil society analysis: Local civil society can be involved in providing information and in undertaking analysis of this. An example of this approach has been developed under the FEWER model for early warning. It consists of regional networks of NGOs and independent experts, who regularly compile and analyse information on conflict-prone regions and develop options for response. While the FEWER model is a bottom-up approach, donors themselves can do much to encourage the participation of local NGOs in data collection and analysis.

- Support for NGO networks and contacts: Co-operation with NGOs would allow donors to build on the networks and information sources of international NGOs, many of which have long been engaged in conflict-prone regions. The institutional memory of such organisations can add depth to donor perceptions and analyses of conflict. Consulting local and international NGOs with a track-record on relevant issues (e.g. youth in conflict, light weapons, sexual violence) during the process of preparing PCIA allows donors to develop better analysis and reach more informed conclusions.
- Enhancement of co-ordination between the multitude of actors. The ultimate objective of all efforts has to be to enhance the security and livelihoods of people affected by conflict. Both donor governments and major multilateral donors such as the World Bank have recognised that effective conflict prevention and peace-building require improved coherence within the full range of external policy instruments.

## Methodological issues

A key challenge for agencies wishing to use conflict assessment frameworks is the quality of information and analysis. This applies to communications and to the flow of information within organisations. It is essential to create an atmosphere of trust, transparency and accountability, in which staff at all levels feel free to pass on information, even if it is potentially sensitive. Information exchange and consultation with stakeholders, other agencies, government institutions and national and international analysts need to be fostered.

### Need for multidisciplinary approaches

Frameworks for conflict analysis rely on assumptions about the nature, causes and dynamics of conflict. They attempt to systematise and present these assumptions in an accessible form which can assist non-specialists in understanding a complex situation. Yet the quality of assumptions — frequently derived from academic research — determines to a large extent the validity of the tool. It appears that many frameworks and indicator systems are still too general to be of real use in the field. There is urgent need to expand the present research basis, mostly drawn from quantitatively-oriented political science, and to develop multidisciplinary approaches to conflict analysis. Such approaches should capture the complexity of individual cases (at local, national, and sub-regional level as well as on a sectoral basis), map the inter-linkages between structures, institutions and people's actions, and help interpret the dynamics of a conflict. Consideration could be given to involving psychologists, sociologists, and those with experience in cross-cultural evaluation methodologies.

### The need for inclusive and diverse approaches

As outlined above, PCIA frameworks have been largely developed in northern institutions and with northern donors, with little space given to indigenous approaches and southern perspectives. The case studies in this report suggest that a plethora of experience exists which could complement and shape PCIA work in conflict affected communities and regions. Much more can be done to ensure that the development of PCIA and related methodologies occurs with the full collaboration of development actors from northern and southern backgrounds. A wide variety of methodologies and tools for conflict assessment are being developed by donors and NGOs independently of each other. There is a need to bring these disparate initiatives together and to share understanding and practice and learn from experience. However this should not be done with the aim of replicating tools and methodologies. It needs to be recognised that individual agencies, NGOs and donors operate at different levels with different constituencies and mandates. Space and resources need to be provided to allow the development of tools responsive to the needs of diverse institutions and different conflicts.

### The need for tailored approaches

Conflict assessment approaches need to be tailored to the purpose for which they will be applied, as well as to the capacity and ways of working of the end-user. Agencies which intend to commission conflict assessment tools need to be very clear about end-use. Even the best single tool will not be able to capture the full complexity of a conflict situation, nor will it be adequate for all conflicts. More flexible "tool box" methodologies may provide insights into conflicts from

different perspectives.

### **The need to link analysis to decision-making**

Conflict assessment frameworks differ from purely academic conflict analysis procedures in that they aim to enable actors to make informed decisions — which are widely supported and inclusive of stakeholders — and to develop strategic options. Existing frameworks often focus on the former while neglecting the latter. More work is required to develop tools which prioritise options for action and are informed by inclusive and ongoing analysis. Most importantly however, the processes which prompt decision making need to be strengthened. To date, although the requirement to respond to conflict situations is recognised, the means for invoking immediate action are largely absent.

### **Problems of attribution**

Development activities play a somewhat limited role in influencing the course of conflict and this raises questions with respect to causality and attribution. The work of Laprise for CIDA provides the clearest assertion of this problem. He notes that there are rarely “baseline” conflict data against which comparative changes can be measured. In addition, the difficulties of trying to collect such data in situations of high tension need to be taken into account. Laprise suggests that the problem of attributing positive benefit may be approached through recording positive and negative conflict-related developments at macro level — without appropriating them — while undertaking programme and project evaluation through traditional approaches. This may provide insight into the general development of the situation while remaining relatively modest about programme impact. Information sharing and co-operative relationships between and among agencies can also add to the understanding of causality and impact.

## **Conclusions**

In summary, conflict-related rehabilitation and development programmes can only make a contribution to peace if they are mainstreamed and implemented in a coherent, co-ordinated and effective manner. In order to have a positive impact, PCIA needs to be reinforced by:

### **Long-term approaches**

Structural inequalities within society, such as gross disparities of wealth and inequitable power relationships, require long-term sustained engagement by donors; a long-term orientation which addresses the full conflict cycle and links short-term emergency measures to long-term programmes for maximum sustainability. Priority should be given to social investment, which is fundamental to recovery and long-term development. At the “field” level, PCIA and conflict-sensitive development policies should translate into support for approaches that reflect and reinforce solid analytical capacity and strong agency-community relationships.

### **Capacity building**

It is essential to involve communities and local administrations in the decision-making and implementation process to achieve a sense of ownership. Local administrative and management capacities are crucial in sustaining development after foreign agencies have pulled out. The capacity of donor governments also needs to be reinforced as this is identified as a major limiting factor in programme effectiveness.

### **Appropriateness of instruments**

The instruments which are used for conflict prevention and peace-building activities should be regularly monitored to ascertain their suitability and efficiency. In addition, there needs to be a comprehensive funding arrangement allowing for the development, piloting, implementation and evaluation of conflict prevention policies and programmes.

### **Decision-making and project management**

Delays in the release of funds are particularly damaging in politically unstable situations. The procedures for project appraisal and approval need to be streamlined and decentralised to guarantee efficient implementation of peace-building activities. Reporting requirements should give equal importance to programme content and to financial accountability.

**Comprehensive approaches**

It is clear that the range of analytical tools, frameworks and approaches to peace and conflict-sensitive development practice can make an important contribution to the prevention of violence when developed and applied appropriately. However, it is vital that tools are seen as one part of a comprehensive approach and not as a panacea or a substitute for political action. Actors need to work together to support and encourage change on the wider issues which may be fuelling conflict, such as state oppression, or the impact of international financial institutions or trade policies, while working to reduce inequality and violence at the local level. Concerted efforts can at least ensure consistency of aims and expectations.

There is still some way to go before effective and coherent approaches to conflict are in place. While much has been learned and is known about conflict, aid and development there is still much to be discovered. Well-funded, well-grounded empirical field-level applied research is needed to develop a comprehensive understanding of the linkages between conflict, aid and development. This research can then be used to further enhance donor policy and practice in this area. Questions of capacity, resource allocation, political choices, political commitment, and the availability of coherent and effective instruments will also have to be addressed if conflict prevention is to shift from the theoretical to the practical realm, and if the ultimate objective of enhancing the security and livelihoods of people affected by conflict is to be achieved.

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